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A "MAJORITY OF THE ELECTORS" MEANS A
MAJORITY OF THOSE VOTING ON THE
QUESTION
(A criticism of State v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; In re Denny, 156
Ind. 104; In re Boswell, 179 Ind. 292)
FRANK N. RICHMAN*

Three times has the Supreme Court of Indiana squarely faced
the question of what constitutes "a majority of the electors" as
found in Section 1 of Article XVI of the Constitution of 1851.
Six opinions, three dissenting, have been written. The first
majority opinion, State v. Swift,' written by Judge Biddle, and
concurred in by Judges Worden and Howk, shows that he dissented from the view of the concurring judges, so that in fact
there were at least four opinions in that case, a third, dissenting, written by Judge Niblack and a fourth, also dissenting, by
Judge Scott.
The second majority opinion, written by Judge Baker in In re
Denny,2 indicates disagreement with the views of the majority
in State v. Swift, and itself meets the approval only of Judges
Dowling and Monks, for Judge Hadley concurs in part only, and
Judge Jordan wholly dissents.
Not until In re Boswell was an opinion written in which all
the judges then sitting concur and the burden of that opinion,
* Of the Columbus bar.
1 69 Ind. 505.
2 156 Ind. 104.

3 179 Ind. 292.
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which omits argument pro and contra, is that the court has twice
before decided the point.
Intervening is another case, City of South Bend v. Lewis, 4
dealing with a similar phrase in a statute, which indicates
(Judge Baker to the contrary notwithstanding) that four judges
(Howard not participating) would have dissented from the majority in State v. Swift and probably have held an amendment
adopted if ratified by a majority of the electors voting thereon.
And there are other cases similarly decided.
Besides this conflict of opinion in Indiana, two other states
with almost identical constitutional provisions to those of Indiana, have taken opposite views, Idaho by a united court in
Green v. State Canvassers,5 dissenting from, and Wyoming, also
by a united court in State ex rel. Blair v. Brooks, 6 agreeing with,
the majority in Indiana.
With this conflict of opinion it surely is permissible to reexamine the question and, in that connection, the axiomatic saying keeps coming to mind that no question is settled until it is
rightly settled.
If the Supreme Court, as now constituted, were to take the
view of Judges Niblack and Jordan, two more or less vexatious
questions would be eliminated for all time, first, the right of the
court to prescribe educational standards of candidates for admission to the bar, and, second, the right of the legislature to provide for an income tax, gross or net. Amendments were voted
upon covering each of those questions at the election in 1932,
each receiving a majority of the votes cast thereon.
The majority, using the language of Judge Cox in the Boswell
case, say "that the provision is too plain to carry more than one
meaning and the question in any case is not one of construction
but of evidence to determine the number of electors in the state
and whether an amendmnt has received (the vote of) a majority of them." This statement would perhaps be acceptable if,
first, the phrase had not prior to 1851 acquired a common law
meaning presumably known to those who used it, 7 and, second,
if the rule of evidence used to determine the number of electors
were itself not one of construction. Surely so many judges and
courts would not have disagreed were there not difficulty either
4 138 Ind. 512.

5 5 Ida. 130, 95 Am. St. Rep. 169, 47 Pac. 259.

6 17 Wyo. 344, 99 Pac. 874, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478.

7

See 156 Ind. 150, 151.

"MAJORITY OF THE ELECTORS"
In the meaning of the phrase itself or in applying the rule for
determination of the number. of electors.
Every judge who expresses an opinion thereon concedes that
one amendment may be submitted at a special election called for
the sole purpose of voting thereon, and, if more votes are cast
for than against, the amendment is ratified and becomes a part
of the constitution. This concession must, of necessity, be made
by those who hold that the question is one of evidence, for the
rule of evidence which they apply is judicial knowledge obtained
from the official record of the particular election. In no opinion,
except that of Judge Biddle, is there any other suggestion.
The rule adopted by the majority, therefore, may be used with
absurd results. For instance, at the general election held November 6, 1932, 1,576,897 votes were cast for candidates for
presidential electors, 1,566,909 for governor, 1,560,965 for secretary of state, 439,949 for and 236,613 against the lawyers'
amendment. Applying Judge Baker's rule there were at least
1,576,827 electors in Indiana on that day of whom, obviously,
439,949 were less than half. Suppose, however, that the amendment had been voted on at a special election held on November
5th or 7th, the day before or after, the general election, and
that the same number of votes had been cast for and against the
amendment as actually were cast on November 6th. Again applying Judge Baker's rule, the court would take judicial knowledge that the number of electors in Indiana as determined by
such special election was 676,562 of which 439,949 were more
than half, so that the amendment would have been ratified. In
other words the number of electors one day was 1,576,897 and
on the preceding or succeeding day 676,582, an impossible increase or decrease in actuality. A rule which could easily result
in such an absurdity can not be accepted without question and
this is true whether it be considered a rule of evidence or one of
construction.
First, examining the majority opinions, we find in that of
Judge Biddle more by way of argument than in Judge Baker's
and, as before stated, least of all in the final opinion of Judge
Cox which is principally based upon the authority of the other
two and of the Wyoming case, without mention of the Idaho
decision contra. While it adds to the length of this paper, it
seems advisable to take up each majority opinion separately,
summarizing the points made and suggesting the arguments to
the contrary.
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JUDGE BIDDLE'S OPINION (69 IND. 505)

The opinion of Judge Biddle in State v. Swift first refers to
the adoption of Section 7 in Article 10 at an election by less
than a majority of all the voters voting at the election but a
majority of all the votes cast on the amendment, and says that
in view of the fact that the Governor and Secretary of State,
the co-ordinate executive branch of the government, had declared the amendment adopted, the validity of its adoption had
become res judicata.
Judge Biddle's first argument 8 is that the Act of Congress
authorizing the first constitutional convention in Indiana, required action "by a majority of the whole number elected," that
by the act of the Legislature in 1849 "a majority of all the votes
polled at such election" was required to adopt the constitution of 1851; that by the Act of 1850, under which the article in
relation to negroes was submitted separately, "a majority of all
the votes cast" was required to ratify; and that in Article 16,
Section 1 itself is a provision for agreement "by a majority of
the members elected to each of the two houses" and by Article
4, Section 25 a joint bill or resolution must be concurred in by
"a majority of all the members elected to each house." From this
he draws the conclusion that it is a settled policy in Indiana that
neither the constitution nor any amendment may be adopted
"by a plurality of votes of the electors or by any less number
than a majority of the whole number cast at that election."
The conclusion seems farfetched. What Congress may have
provided in its Act of 1816 surely has no bearing upon what the
people of Indiana later provided either through their legislature or in their constitution. What the constitutional convention
provided with reference to the vote necessary in either house
as to amendment of the constitution or as to the passage of a
joint bill or resolution, has no weight in determining what they
did not provide as to the election for ratification, namely, what
should be considered "a majority of said electors." The different
provisions from which he drew his conclusion are not alike and
one at least, the clause "a majority of all the votes cast," has
been construed by many courts to mean the majority of the votes
cast for and against the specific proposition voted upon. 9
8 69 Ind. 505, 514.

9 See the authorities cited pro and con on pages 481 and 482 of the case
note in 22 L. R. A. (N. S.).
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Judge Biddle argues further that constitutions ought not be
amended by a plurality vote. He apparently overlooks the fact
that "plurality" is synonymous with "majority" when only one
proposition is being voted upon.O
Judge Biddle's next argument is that the proceedings of the
constitutional convention disclose that a proposed amendment
to the original article (which article was first introduced substantially in the words in which it ultimately passed), by requiring "a majority of all the votes cast for or against the same" to
ratify an amendment, was rejected in committee. From this he
concludes that such an interpretation is not warranted from the
language ultimately used. The first and a good answer to this
argument is that the debates and proceedings in a constitutional
convention should not influence a court in interpreting the constitution.
"And even if we were certain we had attained to the meaning
of the convention, it is by no means to be allowed a controlling
force, especially if that meaning appears not to be the one which
the words would most naturally and obviously convey. For as
the constitution does not derive its force from the convention
which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to
be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed
that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the
words employed; but rather that they have accepted them in the
sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified
the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to
be conveyed.""
But, secondly, the action of the committee in reporting the
amendment in its present form permits equally the conclusion
that the committee understood the section as finally submitted to
mean just what Stevenson's proposed amendment declared.
Neither the journal nor the debates of the constitutional convention disclose what took place in the committee. Nor does
either of these records show that any debate took place, in convention or committee, as to how "a majority of the electors"
should be determined.
The proceedings, on the other hand, do show that the committee was asked to consider a provision for submission "to the
people at the next general election for their adoption or rejec10 See the distinction made in Judge Niblack's dissenting opinion, 69
Ind. 529.
11 1 Cooley's Cons. Lim. 8th ed. (1927), p. 143.
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tion in such manner as may be prescribed by law; and if a majority of all the electors voting at such election for members of
the House of Representatives shall vote for such amendment or
'12
amendments, the same shall become a part of the constitution.
The Journal also'3 discloses a proposal that the amendment
should be submitted at a general election. Neither of these proposals was included in the final draft. Using the method of
Judge Biddle's argument, from the fact that in the final draft
the vote was not made dependent upon the vote cast for members of the House of Representatives, and that it was not required to be submitted at a general election, the conclusion may
be drawn that the members of the convention did not intend that
the vote on any other proposition or candidate for office should
be considered in determining the vote on the amendment. It is
obvious, of course, that at a special election for that purpose
alone there could be no other proposition or candidate the vote
for which or whom could determine the number of electors.
The next argument of Judge Biddle is that there is no analogy
between electing officers and ratifying a constitutional amendment, that in the one case a plurality of votes may be sufficient
and in the other it is insufficient. This statement disregards the
fact that when the constitutional amendment is the only proposition voted upon, the words plurality and majority are equivalent.
He alludes in various places to the proposition that amendment of the fundamental law should be made more difficult than,
for instance, the amendment of a legislative act. To this there
may be assent without agreeing that the language of the provision for amendment of the constitution should be interpreted
any differently from similar language in a statute. In other
words, the meaning of a word or phrase, as used in the constitution, is no different from the meaning of an identical word or
-phrase used in an act of the legislature. The question is not
what provision for amendment should be made but what was
made.
The only authority cited by counsel for appellee which Judge
Biddle thinks it necessary to distinguish, is the case of Gillespie
v. Palmer. 14
12 Journal, page 693.
13 Journal, page 444.
14 20 Wis. 544.
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There were two provisions in the Wisconsin constitution
which Judge Biddle states were "in apparent conflict," one, providing for extension of the right of suffrage "submitted to a
vote of the people, at a general election, and approved by a
majority of all the votes cast at such election," and the other providing for amendment of the constitution ratified "by a majority
of the electors voting thereon." The Wisconsin court arrived at
the conclusion that both provisions meant the same thing. In
view of the fact the numerous courts, as heretofore pointed out,
have held that "a majority of all the votes cast" means a majority of all the votes cast thereon, the Wisconsin decision is not
anomalous, and, it is submitted, does not deserve the criticism
which it later received (without being overruled) by the Wisconsin Court, but which criticism is relied upon as sufficiently
condemnatory by Judge Baker in his opinion.1 5
Next Judge Biddle attempts to make a distinction between
elections for ratification of constitutions and elections upon the
question of levying taxes, granting privileges, establishing
county seats and electing officers, etc., but as pointed out by
Judge Niblack'l "when, in relation to the same general subject,
the same or equivalent words are used, both in a constitution and
in a statute, there is nothing either in reason or in the authorities, requiring a different construction to be given to such words
when found in the constitution from that which ought to be
given to them when used in the statute."
Referring again to the ratification of the amendment with reference to the Wabash & Erie Canal, Judge Biddle attaches some
significance to the fact that in the Act submitting that amendment provision was made for the Governor's proclaiming that
"the same was duly ratified by the people," whereas under the
Act of 1879 the Governor "had no power to declare whether the
amendment had been adopted or rejected." The answer to this
argument is that the constitution itself provides for no action
upon the part of the Governor. As stated by Judge Niblack' n :
"It is the vote of the electors which ratifies an amendment, and
not the proclamation of the Governor."
Judge Biddle then asserts that the social, municipal and political consequences of the court's decision are not to be considered
15 156 Ind. 123.
16 69 Ind. 532.
17 69 Ind. 537.
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in determining whether or not a constitutional amendment has
been ratified. With this statement there may be full agreement
but, of course, it is not an argument in support of his opinion as
to whether in fact the amendment has been ratified.
Finally,' 8 Judge Biddle announced that the "court holds that
it requires at least a majority of all the votes cast at the same
election to ratify a constitutional amendment" but in the succeeding paragraphs indicates that he is not in agreement as to
the rationale of the decision with the other two of the judges
who subscribe to the majority opinion. He states their view that
the Act of 1879 is defective in not providing for the count of
the votes, saying that "there is no source from which this court
can ascertain whether the amendment received a majority of all
the votes cast at the election or not." With this view he disagrees, asserting that "the number of electors of a state is a
public fact" of which the courts may take judicial notice, but
he does not say specifically how many electors there were at the
time of this election nor point out specifically how he arrives
at the conclusion that less than a majority voted for the amendment.
The effect of this opinion, taken with the dissenting opinions
of Judge Niblack and Judge Scott, is that two judges, Howk and
Worden, held that the amendment was not ratified because there
was no way for the court to determine the whole number of
electors in the state on the day of the election, two, Niblack and
Scott, held that the amendment was ratified because it received
a majority of the votes cast thereon, at this, a township election,
and one, Biddle, held that it was not ratified because he knew
there were more electors in the state than twice the number who
voted for the amendment.
JuDGE BAKER'S OPINION (156 IND. 104)
Judge Baker, after stating the case, starts with the premise
that it would be unnatural to expect that a constitution might be
amended without the affirmative action of a "sovereign majority." He then asserts: "There is no room for construction. The
language is too plain to admit of quibbling. 'Majority' means
'more than half.' 'Electors,' with reference to an election, means,
according to the lexicographers and universally accepted usage,
18 69 Ind. 525.
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'persons possessed of the legal qualifications entitling them to
vote.'" And promptly he reaches the conclusion that "in any
case, the question becomes one, not of constitutional construction, but of evidence."
His next premise is that in the absence of a provision for registration the number of electors is determined by the election
itself.
He then concedes that the General Assembly had the right to
submit the amendment at a special election but having submitted the same at a general election, he asserts, as a matter of
judicial knowledge, that 664,094 votes were cast for presidential electors, 655,065 for governor and 493,670 on another proposed amendment, in each case more than twice 240,031 who
voted for the "lawyers' amendment," from which he asserts,
rather positively, that such an amendment was rejected.
So far in the opinion there is little of argument. The judge
has made up his mind and he is stating his conviction in absolute and positive terms.
He next takes up the argument of the attorney general, that
the proposed amendment must be deemed to have been submitted
at a special election in view of the fact that the legislature of
1899 in submitting the amendment did not conform to the Act of
1889 providing for the submission of future proposed amendments on the state ballot but provided for separate ballots containing the two amendments only. Of course, one legislature
cannot bind future legislatures as to matters within their constitutional power, and the later act must be deemed to have repealed the former if inconsistent therewith. The election, if
special, was such not because of departure from te Act of 1889
but because the amendment was voted upon separately just as it
would have been at a special election for the purpose of ratifying or rejecting one constitutional amendment. Judge Baker further submits the question that if the election be deemed special
as to the two proposed amendments, "how can the court properly
shut its eyes to the fact that the 240,031 votes cast for the proposed amendment in question are less than half of the 493,670
votes recorded as having been counted on the other."
It was this argument upon which Judge Hadley rested his concurrence in the majority opinion. Judge Hadley's concurrence
on this ground only seems inexplicable. The second section of
Article 16 itself provides for a separate vote on amendments
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submitted at the same time. Of course, the vote upon each of
the offices to be filled at this election was likewise separate. If,
therefore, in order to determine whether "a majority of the electors" ratified the particular amendment, it is permissible to
look at any other vote then on the amendment itself, it is just
as logical to look to the vote on governor, presidential electors,
secretary of state or a judge of the supreme court as to the vote
upon the other constitutional amendment.
Again referring to the fact that the court has judicial knowledge, which he designates as "evidence of the very highest
class," that there were at least 664,094 persons entitled to vote,
he says that it is permissible to conjecture that there may have
been more persons entitled to vote but not that there may have
been less. The argument of the attorney general which he thus
assumes to answer apparently was based upon the assumption
that the court might look to the vote on presidential electors to
determine the number of persons then entitled to vote in Indiana.
It is obvious that such an assumption would concede his case.
No dissenting judge makes such assumption or concession.
Judge Baker then answers the rather specious argument of
the attorney general that "a majority of the electors" was not
intended to mean "all of the electors" because the word "all"
before electors was rejected by the constitutional convention, by
stating that "the one form of expression may be more intensive
than the other, but it is not more inclusive."
The next argument of the attorney general which is considered, is that Section 2 of article 16, requiring a count of tle
votes for and against each amendment separately, indicates an
intention that only the votes counted for and against such amendment should be considered in determining the number of electors. Judge Baker says that this "inference would destroy as
well the direct command in section 1 that a proposed amendment 'shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to
each of the two houses,' since a record of the votes 'for' and
'against' in each of the two houses is directed to be entered on
their journals." He emphasizes the language "a majority of
the members elected" stating that it is not a majority of a
quorum or those voting for or against but a majority of the
body that is required. And he asserts that the standard is made
the same in the three bodies, that is, in each of the two houses
and the electorate. If the argument of the attorney general is
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not convincing, 19 neither is the answer, for the requirement as
to the vote in each house is based specifically on the number of
members elected whereas there is no specific definition of the
word "electors." The inference is that the members of the convention thought the word "elector" sufficiently specific, but the
question still remains, what does it mean?
Judge Baker next refers to the history of the article in the
constitutional convention. His argument follows that of Judge
Biddle and is subject to the same criticism.
He then discusses the case of State v. Swift approving the
majority opinion to the extent that "it requires at least a majority of all the votes cast at the same election to ratify a constitutional amendment" but disapproving the holding that the court
judicially knew that more electors had participated in the township elections than had voted for or against the proposed amendment. He holds with Judge Niblack that township elections are
local and that the courts may not take judicial notice of the vote
therein.
Next the case of City of South Bend v. Lewis is discussed by
Judge Baker. He agrees with the conclusion therein reached but
on the ground that the statute in that case and the constitutional
provision are essentially different and he adds that the court in
that case "forecasts the doctrine that is controlling here." He
then quotes the paragraph beginning with the last line of 138
Ind. 533, and continuing for ten lines on page 534, omits the
remainder of page 534, all of page 535 and of 536 except the last
four lines, and couples with the first paragraph quoted, as if it
were a part of the same argument, the second of the "four leading principles" which the court in that case says may be deduced
from the many decisions involving ratification by popular election. This coupling of paragraphs seems most unfair and it results in a distortion of the view that was expressed by Judge
Dailey and concurred in by the other members of the court in
the South Bend case. Reading that opinion fairly and in its
proper sequence, we have the impression that the court was not
in accord with the majority in State v. Swift. In fact, on page
532, Judge Dailey asserts: "It is, at least, evident to our minds
that the rule declared by the court in State v. Swift, supra,
should not be extended so as to embrace any litigation other than
19 But see concurring opinion of Morgan, C. J., in Green v. Board of
Canvassers and Holcomb v. Davis, 56 Ill. 413, referred to infra.
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that arising on the question of amending the organic law of the
2 0

state."

Finally Judge Baker asserts that his conclusion is sustained
by the overwhelming weight of authority and he cites cases
occupying almost two pages of the opinion, sixty cases in all.
Judge Dailey (138 Ind. 513) says:
"From what we have said, we think it clearly appears that four leading
principles may be considered as fully established, namely:
"First. Where a measure is proposed to the people, and its adoption
made to depend on a vote of the majority, those who do not vote are considered as acquiescing in the result declared by those who do vote, even
though those voting constitute a minority of those entitled to vote.
"Second. Where a question is required to be submitted at a certain
regular election, and is made to depend upon a majority of the votes cast
at 'such election', a majority of all the votes cast at the election is meant,
and not merely a majority of the votes cast on that particular question.
"Third. Where, at a general election, a proposition is submitted to
the voters, the result of the vote on the proposition will be determined by
the votes cast for and against it, in the absence of a provision in the law,
under which it is submitted, to the contrary.
"Fourth. Where a legislative body provides that a proposition shall
be submitted to the voters; that those in favor of the proposition shall
cast an affirmative vote, and that those electors opposed to the proposition
shall cast a negative vote, and that 'majority of the votes given' shall be
requisite to the adoption of the proposed measure, then the only votes to
be counted and considered in determining whether the measure is adopted
or not are those which are given on the particular question involved."
"Of the correctness of these four principles we think there can be no
dispute. The only doubts which can arise are those occasioned by a confusion of the second and third. Indeed it may be said that the first and
third principles are identical, and control all such cases except such as are
controlled by statute or constitutional law."
The facts in the South Bend case bring it within the fourth principle
and, it is submitted, the Indiana provision for amending the constitution
falls within the first and third. It certainly does not fall within the second
because there is no provision in the constitution requiring the amendment
to be submitted "at a certain regular election", or making the question
depend upon a majority of the votes "cast at such election".
It will be noted that the Idaho constitution contains the first of these
requirements, namely, the submission of the amendment "to the electors
of the state at the next general election," but does not contain the second
of the requirements, because it reads: "If a majority of the electors shall
ratify the same", and omits the words "at such election". The Idaho constitution, therefore, comes more nearly within the second principle than
that of Indiana, and if the decision of the Idaho court is wrong, it is
because it goes beyond, not because it is in accord, with the dissenting
view in Indiana.
20
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Conspicuous among them are the cases of Green v. State Board
of Canvassers and Gillespie v. Palmer, supra. Twelve others of
the sixty are abstracted and expressly distinguished in the dissenting opinion of Judge Jordan.
Of the sixty cases, sixteen readily are distinguished, fifteen
are against Judge Baker's contention and fifteen of the other
twenty-nine, it is submitted, may, upon careful examination, satisfactorily be distinguished. The sixteen which practically distinguish themselves are the following:
THIRTY-ONE CASES DISTINGUISHED
SLINGERLAND V. NORTON
22
SMITH V. BOARD

21

These two cases involve the same statute which required that
a petition for election must be signed by legal voters of the
county in a number equal to 60% of the whole number voting at
the preceding general election and then provided for a special
election, canvass of the votes for and against, and "if 55% of
the votes cast at such election shall be in favor, etc." In Slingerland v. Norton, the court held that the 60% is determined from
the poll lists, not the official count of the votes at such preceding election, and in Smith v. Board the court held that the unintelligible as well as the legal votes must be counted to determine
the number of "votes cast."
23
STATE V. MAYOR OF ST. LOUIS

A statute read "submitted to the qualified voters thereof at a
general or special election * * * and accepted by at least threefifths of the qualified voters voting thereat."
24

STATE V. McGOWAN
A constitutional provision read "whenever a majority of the
legal voters * * * voting an any general election, shall so determine." Another constitutional provision read "question of continuing same may be submitted to a vote of the electors of such
county at a general election * * * and if a majority of all the
votes cast upon that question shall be against, etc." The court
21 59 Minn. 351.
22 64 Minn. 16.
23 73 Mo. 435.
24 138 Mo. 187.
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called attention to the explicit language in the latter provision
as indicating that the former should not be read to mean a majority voting upon the question. This comparison may have had
weight in the decision of the Missouri court in previous cases,
although not stressed therein.
STATE V. BABCOCK

25

This is one of the leading Nebraska cases. The constitution
provided for notice for three months "preceding the next election of senators and representatives, at which election the same
shall be submitted to the electors for approval or rejection, and
if a majority of the electors voting at suck election adopt such
amendments, etc." And one of the three judges dissented, claiming that the vote on the question should determine.
STATE V. VANCAMP

26

There was no decision on the point-merely an unconsidered
dictum.
27

STATE V. FORAKER

The constitution provided for notice for six months "preceding the next election for senators and representatives at which
time the same shall be submitted * * * and if a majority of the
electors, voting at suck election, etc." The case is like State v.
25
Babcock.
28

GAVIN V. CITY OF ATLANTA
MAYOR V. WILSON 2 9

In these two cases, the second citing and approving the former,
the question turned on whether or not there had been a registration of voters, the former, where special registration was
required, holding that the number of qualified voters was determined by the registration list, the latter, where there had been
no registration, holding that because thereof it was impossible
to determine the number of qualified voters.
STATE V. CORNELL8 0

The language of a statute was "if two-thirds of the votes cast
on such proposition at such election" (general or special).
25 17
26 36
27 46
28 86
29 96

Neb. 188.
Neb. 91.

Oh. St. 677.
Ga. 132.
Ga. 251.

30 (Neb.) 74 N. W. 59.
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STATE V. WURTS 3 1
BOTT V. SECRETARY OF STATE

32

The same litigation is involved in these cases. The principal
question was whether the canvass of a vote by the legislative
department was res judicata and State v. Swift was cited as
authority therefor. The constitutional provision involved required submission of amendments "at a special election held for
that purpose" and "if the people shall * * * ratify such amendment * * * by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for
members of the legislature voting thereon, etc."
33
SMITH V. PROCTOR

Here the language of the statute was "whenever a majority
of all the inhabitants * * * entitled to vote, to be ascertained
by taking and recording the ayes and noes of such inhabitants
attending * * * at any meeting legally * * * held."
SOUTHERLAND V. GOLDSBORo

DUKE V. BROWN

34

35

The determination of the number of "qualified voters" is by
this court limited to the registration lists. The first case held
that "by the vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein,"
means a majority of those registered, regardless of the number
who were eligible to register. The second case following the former held that a proposition failed where 245 voted for, 125
against and there were 607 registered.
DAVIS V. BROWN 36
A statute provided that if three-fifths of all votes cast at said
election upon the question be in favor of the relocation" the
county seat should be changed. The opinion contains language
to the effect that where provision is made for a negative vote,
one who does not vote should not be counted as voting "no."
Of the twenty-nine cases which Judge Baker would have been
justified in citing as supporting his view, the following fifteen
bear distinguishing marks.
31 61 N. J. L. 163.

32
33
34
35

62 N. J. L. 107.
130 N. Y. 319.
96 N. C. 49.
96 N. C. 127.

36 46 W. Va. 716.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
37
PEOPLE V. BERKELEY

This was a constitutional provision reading "whenever a majority of the electors voting at a general election" and falls
within Judge Dailey's second principle.
38

BELKNAP V. CITY OF LouIsvILLE

There were two constitutional provisions under consideration,
the first permitting not more than one election (for all purposes)
within a year, and the other forbidding certain action "without
the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose." The court held that there was
only one election, though separate vote, and the proposition to
carry must receive votes equal to two-thirds of the highest vote
cast on any proposition or office. The reasoning is in accord
with Judge Baker's view, but the words "voting at an election"
serve to distinguish the clause from that in the Indiana constitution. And, besides, the case is expressly overruled in Fiscal
Court v. Trimble.3 9
STATE V. POWELL 40
The constitution provided that "notice * * * shall be given
* *, preceding an election, at which the qualified electors shall
vote directly for or against such change * * * and if it shall
appear that a majority of the qualified electors voting shall have
voted for, etc.," the constitution shall be so amended. The word
"voting" is of course indefinite. The court chose to insert the
words "at the election" instead of "on the question." They were
influenced, doubtless, by the wording of previous constitutions to
which attention is called in the opinion. Judge Jordan's language 41 concerning this case refers to the wording of the previous constitutions, not the clause in question above quoted.
STATE V. LANCASTER

C0.42

Like People v. Berkeley 37 and Belknap v. Louisville, 38 the
words "voting at any general election" in the clause "whenever
a majority of the legal voters of such county, voting at any gen37 102 Cal. 298.

38 99 Ky. 474.
39 (Ky.) 47 S. W. 773.
40 (Miss.) 27 S. 927.
41 156 Ind. 129.
42

6 Neb. 474.
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eral election shall so determine," permit the inference that it is
the vote at the election rather than on the question which determines the majority.
STATE V. BECHEL4 3
In this case the reasoning of the court is in line with Judge
Baker's view but the cases are differentiated by the last three
words of the two constitutional clauses considered by the
Nebraska court: "No such general law shall be passed by the
legislature granting the right to construct * * * a street railroad within any city * * * without first requiring the consent
of the majority of the electors thereof." Also, "and if a majority of the votes cast at such election, etc."
44

ENYART V. TRUSTEES
The opinion in this case contains neither argument nor
authority. The words of the statute considered were "until a
majority of the electors . . . at some regular election, shall
vote in favor of said levy". The Court said that to get the correct meaning the word "voting" should be inserted before "at
some regular election". Thus, the case is in line with People v.
Berkeley, 37 and distinguished from the Indiana majority rule.
DUPERIER v. VIATOR 45
CITIZENS, ETC., V. WILLIAMS 4 6

These cases should be considered together. The former is a
short opinion citing only Bayard v. Klinge. 47 The language
considered is "submitted to a vote of the property taxpayers of
such parish . . . entitled to vote under the election laws of
the State, and if a majority of same voting at such election shall
have voted therefor". The Court said these words were "liable
to no other construction" than that the majority be determined
by the number who voted at the election, not on the question.
But in the second case, with this language, "by a vote of the
property tax payers in numbers and in value", the number who
voted on the proposition was taken to determine the majority.
So Louisiana is committed to the Indiana dissenting opinion.
43 22 Neb. 158.

25
35
46 49
47 16
44

45

Oh. St. 618.
La. Ann. 957.
La. Ann. 422.
Minn. 249.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

CocKE v. GoocH48

49

BOULDIN V. LOCKHART
5°
BRADEN V. STUMPH

In the first of these cases, while the language directly involved, "without the consent of two-thirds of the qualified
voters", is not dissimilar from that of the Indiana constitution,
the court calls attention to another constitutional provision containing specific language showing that it is "binding upon those
not voting", and says, by contrast, that the clause in question
required a majority of all the voters, not merely those who vote
thereon. The second case deals with a similar clause where the
word "concurrence" is used instead of "consent". The third
cites and follows the other two.
ST. JOSEPH TP.V. ROGERS 5 1

Bonds had been issued by a Missouri township after an election in which only a minority of those entitled to vote participated. Held, that as a majority of those voting at the election
voted for the bond issue, the same was legal within the constitutional provision "when elections have already been held, and a
majority of the legal voters of any township were in favor of"
such bond issue. There is no issue raised in this or the other
United States Supreme Court cases cited by Judge Baker as to
whether a majority voting upon the question, not being a
majority voting at the election, would be such a majority as is
contemplated by this provision.
COUNTY OF CASS V. JOHNSTON

52

53

DOUGLAS V. Co. OF PIKE
CARROLL Co. V. SMITH

KNOX Co. V. BANK

54

55

In the first of these cases the court holds that a Missouri
statute reading "whenever two-thirds of the qualified voters of
5 Heisk (Tenn.) 294.
49 3 Baxt. (Tenn.) 262.
50 16 Lea (Tenn.) 581.
48

51 16 Wall. 644.
52 95 U. S. 360.
53

101 U. S.677.

54 111 U. S. 556.
55 147 U. S. 91.
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the township, voting at an election called for that purpose, shall
vote in favor of the subscriptions", is within a constitutional
provision reading "unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of
the town at a regular or special election to be held therein shall
assent thereto". In the second case the first is re-examined and
approved. In the third, involving a Mississippi constitutional
provision reading "unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of
such county at a special or regular election to be held therein,
shall assent thereto", the court noted that both Missouri and
Mississippi had constitutional provisions requiring registration
of voters. The evidence showed 3,129 registered voters, a vote
of 918 for and 362 against, the 918 being a majority of the total
vote cast. Held that the bond issue was authorized. The last
of these cases merely reaffirms the holding in the others.
The remaining fourteen of the cases fairly sustaining Judge
Baker's view come from six jurisdictions, Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska and New York. Those from
each state may be examined together.
SIX JURISDICTIONS SUSTAIN JUDGE BAKER'S VIEW

PEOPLE V. BROWN 56
PEOPLE V. GARNER

PEOPLE V. WIANT

57

58

HOODs 9
The language of the constitution involved in the first three of
these cases was "whenever a majority of the voters of such
county, at any general election shall so determine". In the
Brown case, without argument or citation, the court said the
language admitted of one meaning, a majority of all the legal
voters. In the Garner case, without citation of authority, the
court gave the same meaning, adding that the vote east is prima
facie evidence of the number of voters. In the Wiant case the
decision was the same, with only one case cited, People v. Warfield.60 In the fourth case the language was "unless a majority
CHESTNUTWOOD V.

56 11 III. 478.
57 47 M"1.
246.

58 48 IRi. 263.
59 68 ]1. 132.
60 20 Ill. 160.
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of the legal voters of said town .

. shall vote for the same,

at an election to be held under the order of the corporate
authorities

.

.

as is

.

.

.

or may be

.

. provided

for". The court relies on People v. Wiant, distinguishing Holcomb v. Davis. 61
STEBBINS V. JUDGE6 2

"Unless the qualified electors of said city, voting in their
respective wards, shall have authorized

.

.

.

by a majority

of their votes cast at any regular election, or at a special election
called for the purpose of voting upon such question." The
courts are divided on this class of cases as hereinbefore noted.
In this case the court held that the total votes cast at the election, not the votes cast on the question, was the determining
factor. While the reasoning supports Judge Baker, the language of the Michigan constitution differs materially from that
of Indiana.
BAYARD V. KLINGE 63
EVERETT V. SMITH6"

These two cases are based upon Taylor v. Taylor, 65 not cited
by Judge Baker. In the Bayard case the court held that a statute reading "after the submission to the electors of said county
at the next general election after the passage thereof, and its
adoption by a majority of such electors voting thereon" was
not within a constitutional provision requiring the question to
"be submitted to the electors of the county, at the next general
election after the passage thereof, and be adopted by a majority
of such electors".
The other case merely followed the two former. The Minnesota constitution differs from Indiana's in requiring the question
to be submitted at a general election, from which it may be
inferred that the intention was to get an expression from a
larger number of voters drawn to the polls by interest in the
candidates and that the test should be the number voting at
the election.
61 56 Ill. 413.
62

108 Mich. 693.

63 16 Minn. 249.
64 22 Minn. 53.
65 10 Minn. 107.

"MAJORITY OF THE ELECTORS"
STATE V. WINKELMEIER0 6
67
STATE V. SUTTERFIELD

STATE V. FRANCIS

68

Like the early cases of first impression in other jurisdictions,
no authorities are cited and the reasons are not given for the
court's holding in the Winkelmeier case that "whenever a
majority of the legal voters of the respective cities in said
county authorize", requires a majority of all the legal voters of
the city and "not merely of all those who might at a particular
time choose to vote upon the question". The Sutterfield case
"Unless two-thirds of the
has slightly differing language:
qualified voters of the county . . . at a general election,
shall vote in favor of such removal." State v. Francis construes these words, "whenever a majority of the legal voters
authorize them so to do". In the two later cases State v. Winkelmeier is relied upon as authority. As heretofore noted in comment on State v. McGowan, 69 the court in all three of these cases
may have been influenced by a companion clause in the constitution which expresses clearly the intention that a vote on the
question should determine, indicating that without such expressed intention the vote at the election should be the guide.
70

STATE V. ANDERSON
7
BRYAN V. CITY OF LINCOLN 1
2
TECUMSEH, ETC., V. SAUNDERS7

These three cases rely upon State v. Babcock, 7 9 in which it
would seem there ought to have been no difference of opinion,
although one of the three judges dissented. In the Anderson
case the language was: "If it appears that two-thirds of the
votes cast are in favor"; in the Bryan case: "when the same
shall have been authorized by a vote of the people". The third
case follows State v. Babcock, but extends it to mean a majority
of the highest number of votes cast at the election, not a majority of the number cast for representatives and senators.
66 35 Mo. 103.
67 54 Mo. 391.
68 95 Mo. 44.

69 138 Mo.
70 26 Neb.
71 50 Neb.
72 51 Neb.
73 17 Neb.

187.
517.
620.
801.
188.
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PEOPLE V. TRUSTEES 74
In this case it was held that a majority of all the taxable
inhabitants, not a majority of the votes cast, is required by the
words: "The taxable inhabitants may at a meeting by a majority vote decide."
NINE JURISDICTIONS AGAINST JUDGE BAKER'S VIEW

Remaining for consideration are fourteen of the fifteen cases
cited by Judge Baker which do not support his contention but
tend to show that the weight of authority, by jurisdiction, was
then with Judge Jordan's dissenting view. These nine jurisdictions (with one dissenting case in Illinois) are Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, North Dakota, Oregon,
Wisconsin, and a Federal Court sitting in Kansas.
The Idaho case, Green v. State Board, 75 one of the two Wisconsin cases, Gillespie v. Palmer,7 6 and the Louisiana case, Citizens, etc., v. Williams,77 have been discussed, supra.

The dissenting Illinois case, Holcomb v. Davis,7 9 had under
consideration a statute which required both affirmative and
negative votes on the question. There was also a section reading "until it shall be ratified by a majority of the legal voters
of the county". The court said: "This section considered independent of other provisions of the act, would, no doubt," (as
theretofore held in People v. Wiant) "require a majority of
all the votes cast at the election at which the question was submitted for its adoption." But "if those not voting are to be
counted against the law, why require them to vote at all upon
the question. It would be a supererogation. Hence we conclude, there was a reason for requiring a negative as well as
an affirmative vote. And that reason was, no doubt, to enable
a majority voting on the question, to control in its adoption or
rejection."
74 70 N. Y. 28.
75 47 Pac. 259.
76 20 Wis. 544.
77

49 La. Ann. 422.

7856111.413.
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COUNTY SEAT OF LINN C0 9
COMMISSIONERS V. WINKLEY8 0

STATE V. ECHOLS 81
In the first of these three cases the constitution read: "No
county seat shall be changed without the consent of a majority
of the electors of the county." Held, where the legislature has
provided an election, made no provision for registration, and
designated no other list or roll as evidence of the number of
electors, it may, under the constitutional provision quoted, declare that the place receiving a majority of the votes cast shall
be the county seat.
The second case, which cited the former and also Rex v. Foxcraft, 82 Gillespie v. Palmer, 76 Cass v. Johnston County, 52 and
Railroad Co. v. Davison,8 3 held that under a statute reading,
"call an election, to be held at a general election . . . and
shall submit to the electors the question to adopt or reject the
If a majority of the votes are for the bounty,
.
bounty. .
etc.," a majority voting on the question was sufficient to authorize the bounty.
State v. Echols, following the Winkley case, held that language, "shall be submitted to the voters of a county at a general or special election . . . and if a majority of all the votes
cast shall be in favor of," authorized a majority of the votes.
cast on the question to determine.
FIscAL COURT V. TRIMBLE
JONES V. COMMONWEALTH

RUSH V. COMMONWEALTH

84
85

86

The Trimble case expressly overrules Belknap v. City of
Louisville, supra, and holds that "without the assent of twothirds of the voters thereof, voting at an election to be held for
that purpose" permits the majority voting on the question to
7915 Kan. 500.
80 29 Kan. 36.
8141 Kan. 1.
82 2 Burr. 1017.
83 1 Snead 638.
84 (Ky.) 47 S. W. 773.
85 (Ky.) 47 S. W. 328.
86 (Ky.) 47 S. W. 586.
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determine. The Jones case held likewise as to this language:
"until approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election
to be held at the next regular November election," but adds
that while held on the same day it was a separate election. Rush
v. Commonwealth had these words under consideration: "If it
shall appear from a comparison of the polls that a majority of
the votes cast at said election are against the sale." The court
said: "In our opinion this is equivalent to saying 'voting on
such question'." The first of these three cases construed a seetion. in the constitution, the others statutes.
WALKER V. OSWALD8 7
From this case Judge Jordan quotes at length (156 Ind. 146).
It involved a statute requiring both affirmative and negative
votes. The words "if a majority of the voters of said county
shall determine by their ballots in favor of the high license law"
were held to mean "voting on the question."
STATE V. BARNES 8 8
STATE V. LANGLIE8 9
The Act of Congress authorizing adoption of a constitution
and election of the first state officers at the same election contained this clause: "At the elections provided for in this section the qualified voters of said proposed states shall vote
directly for or against the proposed constitution . . . and
if a majority of the legal votes cast shall be for" the constitution
shall be adopted. A majority of those voting on the adoption
but not a majority of those voting on the offices was declared
to have adopted the constitution. In the Langlie case the court
reached the same conclusion in the consideration of the statute
reading: "If upon canvassing the vote so given it shall appear
that any one place has two-thirds of the vote polled" (at a general election).
STATE V. GRACE9 0

"At the next general election the question . . . shall be
submitted to the legal voters of the county, and the place receiv87

68 Md. 146.

88 3 N. Dak. 319.
89 5 N. Dak. 594.
90 20 Ore. 154.
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ing a majority of all the votes cast shall be the permanent
county seat." This statute was held to mean a majority of the
votes cast on the proposition, not on some other question.
ARMOUR BROS. BANKING Co. V. BOARD

91

A Kansas statute read: "Shall be submitted to a vote of the
people at some general election and a majority of all the votes
cast, at a poll opened for that purpose, shall be in favor of such
assessment." The court, citing Jones v. Lancaster 9 2 and State
v. Winkelmeier,9 3 declined to follow them and held the assessment adopted by the vote of the majority who voted thereon.
At the time of the decision of In re Denny, another jurisdiction, Connecticut, might have been added to those against Judge
Baker's view. State ex rel. Duane v. Fagan, 94 erroneously cited
by counsel in the Wyoming case,6 discloses that under a statute
providing for a "major vote of the qualified members present"
it was held that the number of "members present" was determined by the vote cast on the office in question. The later case
of Town of Southington v. Southington Water Co., 95 to the same
effect, does not refer to the former, but itself is the subject of
a lengthy note in 13 Ann. Cas. 416, which attempts to collect
but not to harmonize the cases.
In determining whether or not, as stated by Judge Baker,
his conclusion "issustained . . . by the overwhelming weight
of authority," it is permissible to look to the dissenting opinion
of Judge Jordan for cases therein cited, which, of course, were
available also to Judge Baker. Among these are Dayton v. City
of St. Paul, 96 which, as shown by Judge Jordan on page 134, is in
harmony with the dissenting rather than the majority opinion.
This case rather discounts the effect of the earlier Minnesota
cases cited by Judge Baker.
Howland v. Board of Supervisors, 97 as abstracted by Judge
Jordan on page 143, eliminates the Town of Berkeley 98 case and
puts California in the dissenting class.
9141 Fed. 321.
92 6 Neb. 474.
93 35 Mo. 103.
94 42 Conn. 32.
95 80 Conn. 646.
96 22 Minn. 400.
97 109 Cal. 152.
98 102 Cal. 298.
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May v. Bermel, 99 referred to by Judge Jordan on page 149,
is not in harmony with People v. Trustees, 100 so that the State
of New York may not be cited as a jurisdiction wholly committed to the Indiana majority rule.
The case of Schlichter v. Keiter, 10 1 cited by Judge Jordan
on page 152, places this jurisdiction in the group that had
rejected Judge Baker's conclusion. This case also and the
similar cases, including Lamb v. Cain, 10 2 answer Judge Baker's
assertion that the question is one of evidence. It was found as
a fact in the Pennsylvania case that the enrolled membership
was over 200,000. Of this number 51,070 voted affirmatively
and 3,310 negatively. The evidence showed also that 16,187
preferred another mode of proceeding than that which had
been taken so that there was a total expression from 70,567,
about one-third of the enrolled membership. The constitution
of the church organization provided: "There shall be no alteration of the foregoing constitution unless by the request of twothirds of the whole society." Clearly the court had sufficient
evidence to determine that the necessary two-thirds had not requested the change but the court held that those who did not
vote when the opportunity was presented, should not be counted
against but as acquiescing.
In view of the decisions available to the court when In re
Denny was decided, it is hard to understand how Judge Baker
could have come to the conclusion that the overwhelming weight
of authority supported his view. If he had intended to cite all
the cases on the subject, whether for or against his view, he
would have included in addition to those cited, some twenty or
more referred to in Judge Jordan's opinion. The inference is
rather that he did not analyze the cases which he did cite. And
he was mistaken as to the weight of authority. This, however,
was probably of no significance to himfor it is apparent that
his conclusion was not reached by balancing arguments or
authorities. The solution to him was simple. Electors meant
all the people in the state qualified to vote, and if there had
been some way of determining their number independent of the
election, he would have adopted that method. The one he chose
99 20 N. Y. App. Div. 53.
100

70 N. Y. 28.

101 156 Pa. St. 119.
1o2 129 Ind. 486.

"MAJORITY OF THE ELECTORS"

is just as arbitrary as the one advocated by Judge Jordan and,
as before stated, leads to more incongruous results.
I

JUDGE CoX's

OPINION, 179 IND. 292.

This, the third of the majority opinions in Indiana, asserts
as a matter of judicial knowledge that 627,133 ballots were cast
for the several candidates for Secretary of State in 1910, all
of them containing thereon the amendment, but only 60,357
marked for and 14,494 against. After quoting from State v.
Swift and In re Denny, Judge Cox says: "that the court adheres
to the holding in them and finds no difficulty of evidence as the
same ballots which contained the amendment also carried the
names of candidates for all state offices headed by Secretary
of State and "it is thus made manifest that there were at least"
627,133 electors in the state qualified to vote at the election.' 0 3
Then is cited the Wyoming case. The remainder of the opinion
deals with the question of whether the constitution is "locked"
by this amendment. The sum total of this opinion is that twice
before the court decided the question and now adheres to that
decision.

THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
A detailed analysis of the dissenting opinions is not necessary,
for the purpose of this paper is not to sustain either of the
dissenting judges but to show the weaknesses of the majority
opinions. However, the views of Judges Niblack, Scott and
Jordan should be summarized and their conclusions shown. In
certain things they agree, as follows:
1. Under the common law and the usual practice those electors who are absent from an election or, who attending, do not
vote, are not counted against but as acquiescing in the will of
the majority of those voting. All the authorities cited therefor
104
in the three opinions are listed in the foot note.
103
104

179 Ind. 292, 297.
McCrary, American Law of Elections, Sec. 183; Cooley's Constitu-

tional Limitations, p. 619; Dillon, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 215; Cushing, Parliamentary Law, 117, 120, 131; County of Cass v. Johnston, 95

U. S. 360, 24 L. ed. 416; St. Joseph Tp. v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 21 L. ed.
328; Angell & Ames, Corp. See. 499, 500; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v.

County Court, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 637, 692; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 526; State ex rel., etc. v. Renick, 37 Mo. 270: People v. Warfield,
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2.

A constitutional amendment may be submitted at a special

election for that purpose only and if the votes in the affirmative
are more than those inthe negative, the amendment is ratified.

3.

Both of these rules are true in the absence of express

provision in the constitution to the contrary.

4. The Supreme Court may take judicial notice of the votes
cast at an election wherein candidates for state office or statewide issues have been voted upon, but such "judicial information" must be exact and not merely approximate. 10 5
5. The court will not look beyond the official canvass of votes

at the particular election to determine the number of electors
on that day.

6.

The election in April, 1880,106 the one in November,

1900,107 and, by inference, that in November, 1932, each was,

as to the constitutional amendment, a special election, for though
the same "machinery" was used in obtaining the vote, separate
ballots were provided and separate returns were made. 08 This
distinction is emphasized also in the cases noted below. 10 9
Perhaps in other minor matters, the three judges were in
agreement. They did not agree, however, in their final con20 Ill. 160 (all above cited by Niblack, 69 Ind. 523 et seq.); People v.
Garner, 47 Ill. 246; People v. Wiant, 48 Ill. 265 (cited by Scott, 69 Ind.
542); City of South Bend v. Lewis, 138 Ind. 512; McCrary on Elections,
(4th ed.) Sec. 208; Dayton v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 400; Walker v.
Oswald, 68 Md. 146, 11 Atl. 711; Smith v. Proctor, 130 N. Y. 319, 29 N. E.
312; May v. Bermel, 20 N. Y. App. Div. 53, 46 N. Y. Supp. 622; Oldknow
v. Wainwright, 2 Burr 1017, 1021; Gosling v. Velvey, 7 Ad. & El. (N. S.)
406, 456 (see also 7 Q. B. 406); Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rushville,
121 Ind. 206; State v. Dillon, 125 Ind. 65; Lamb v. Cain, 129 Ind. 437;
State v. Vanosdal, 131 Ind. 388; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Harden, 137
Ind. 486; Schlichter v. Keiter, 156 Pa. St. 119, 27 Atl. 45, 22 L. R. A. 161;
Kuns v. Robertson, 154 Ill. 394, 40 N. E. 343 (cited by Jordan, 156 Ind.
132 et seq.).
105 Niblack, 69 Ind. 355.
106 State v. Swift.

In re Denny.
Niblack, 69 Ind. 534; Scott, id. 540; Jordan, 156 Ind. 159.
109 City of South Bend v. Lewis, 138 Ind. 512, 532; Green v. State
Board, 5 Ida. 130, 95 Am. St. Rep. 169, 47 Pac. 259; State v. Barnes, 3 N.
Dak. 319, 55 N. W. 883; Fiscal Court v. Trimble, 104 Ky. 629, 47 S. W.
773, 42 L. R. A. 738; Tinkel v. Griffin, 26 Mont. 426, 66 Pac. 859; State
ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N. Dak. 31, 119 N. W. 360; Davis v. Brown,
46 W. Va. 716, 34 S. W. 839; Jones v. Commonwealth, 104 Ky. 468, 47
S. W. 328.
107

108
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clusion. Judge Niblack could see a distinction between a local
election, of which the court might not take judicial notice, and
a general election.1 10 He probably would have aligned himself
with the majority in the Boswell case, where there was only one
ballot containing the names of all candidates and listing all
issues.
But Judges Jordan and Scott went further. They carried
the above noted rules to a logical conclusion, finding nothing in
the constitution itself to indicate that the common law and usual
procedure should not apply in determining the vote on the amendment. They accordingly held that only those votes should be
counted which were for and against the amendment itself, and
that a majority of this total was "a majority of the electors"
within the meaning of the constitution.
Judge Jordan had additional reasons for his conclusion, among
which is the argument"' that Section 2 of Article 16 requires
two or more amendments to be submitted so that the vote for
or against each may be recorded separately. Why provide for
vote "against" if every elector not voting "for" is to be counted
"against". This is the distinction that makes the case of Holcomb v. Davis" 2 stand out from the other Illinois cases. In it
was a constitutional provision not distinguishable from that in
Indiana. And the Illinois court, already committed by State v.
Wiant to what is herein called the majority rule, departed therefrom solely because of the additional requirement of both
affirmative and negative vote, which satisfied that court that the
intention of those who used the language was that the vote for
and against the proposition itself should be the sole determining
factor. This case, it is submitted, has not been sufficiently
stressed. It contains a vital distinction which is recognized as
well in Davis v. Brown, 113 Green v. State Board of Canvassers," 4 and City of South Bend v. Lewis." 5
In the beginning the absurd consequences of certain application of the majority rule was suggested. This is not true of
the rule concurred in by Judges Scott and Jordan. The num110 69 Ind. 534.
Ill 156 Ind. 157.
11256 I1. 413.
113 46 W. Va. 716, 34 S. E. 839.
114 5 Ida. 130, 47 Pac. 259, 262.
115 138 Ind. 512, 536.
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ber of electors remains the same whether the election is general
or special. It cannot be a million one day and one hundred
thousand the next. It is not determined by the total votes cast
for presidential electors, as in 1880; for secretary of state, as
in 1900; and by the ballots, marked and unmarked, deposited
in the boxes, as in 1932. It is determined by counting the ballots for and against the amendment itself. This is the usual,
the common law, way of deciding the question. If a different
method had been intended, it could and would have been made
specific.
No attempt is made herein to collect all the authorities, even
those prior to the decision of In re Denny. It might be noted,
however, that North Dakota has in two later decisions reaffirmed State v. Barnes. 11
South Dakota had apparently followed In re Denny. See
Williamson v. Aldrich,1 7 although the case might be distinguished in that the court said the demurrer admitted "that
there were more than 1,700 duly qualified electors in such
municipality at the time of the election and that but 833 voted
in favor of the bonds."
Kansas has a case, Clayton v. Hill City,118 that "out-Herod's
Herod," holding that neither the votes on the bond issue nor
the votes on other candidates or issues at a general election will
be considered as determining the total number of electors under
a clause reading that no bonds shall be issued except upon "a
vote of a majority of the qualified electors of such city." The
issue required more proof than the election returns.
With the exceptions above noted, the texts, digests and casenotes examined do not indicate any material change in the
weight of authority or new or additional reasons in support of
either view.
Government in the United States, as in England before the
American revolution, has often been by minority. It was so in
1852 and becomes so more impressively as the population increases and suffrage is extended. Other state constitutions,
particularly those adopted in recent years, expressly provide
for amendment by a majority of the vote thereon. Without
116 See State v. Blaisdell, 18 N. Dak. 31, 119 N. W. 360; State v. Board
of Canvassers, (1919) 44 N. Dak. 126, 172 N. W. 180.
117 22 So. Dak. 13, 108 N. W. 1063.
118 (1922) 111 Kan. 595, 207 Pac. 770.

"MAJORITY OF THE ELECTORS"

such construction Indiana's constitution is impossible of amendment except at the prohibitive cost of a special election which
probably would poll a smaller vote on the identical question
than a general election. This is not an argument of convenience, for social or political purposes, but a suggestion to remove
the opposing motive that evidently actuated Judge Baker, who
believed that for the public good constitutional amendment
should be made difficult. It can be made difficult, to the verge
of impossibility, but, it is submitted, that was not the intention
of the convention that framed nor the people who ratified the
constitution of 1852. Both reason and authority, it is submitted,
sustain the view, best expressed in Indiana by Judge Jordan,
that the majority of those voting on the amendment, whether
the election be general or special, is the "majority of the electors" contemplated by the constitution. 119
119 At least three practical lines of inquiry are presented to those who
accept the conclusions of the writer:
1. Is the question stare decisis? The answer seems to be in the negative. Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307; State ex rel. City of Terre Haute
v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434, 449; Jasper County v. Allman, 142 Ind. 573, 42
N. E. 206, 39 L. R. A. 58; The Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 554, 570,
20 L. ed. 287; Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 458,
13 L. ed. 1058; Brickhouse v. Hill, 167 Ark. 513, 268 S. W. 865, 867;
Weaver v. First National Bank, 76 Kan. 540, 94 Pac. 273, 123 A. S. R. 155,
16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 110; 7 R. C. L. 1008.
2. How may the question be raised? The answer seems to be that it
is already raised by the election of 1932. The language of Judge Scott,
69 Ind. 544, is pertinent. Each amendment then voted upon became a
part of the constitution "the moment the last ballot was cast, and all that
was afterwards done in relation to the election, such as the aggregation,
compilation and certification of the vote by the several officers, and the
proclamation of the Governor, was done in compliance with the methods
adopted by the General Assembly for the purpose of ascertaining an
already accomplished fact."
3. How may "the accomplished fact" be judicially noticed? The suggested answer, so far as the "lawyers' amendment" is concerned, is that
the Supreme Court may prescribe more rigid educational qualifications for
admission to the bar, sustaining them by an express declaration that the
constitution was amended in 1932, eliminating Article 7, Section 21. With
this provision out of the constitution there can be no question of the
Court's inherent power to prescribe the qualifications and regulate the
conduct of its officers, the members of the bar. If the Court chooses not
to make such a declaration of its own motion, the issue may be raised by
petition of the Indiana State Bar Association or in an adversary proceeding.

